Asymmetric warfare—employing drones and sea mines—has reshaped engagement rules against the Houthis and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.
On July 20, the Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea, citing a Saudi “siege” of Yemen and marking their formal entry into the broader U.S.–Iran conflict.
Shortly after, the Houthis claimed missile and drone strikes on the Saudi oil tankers Encelia and Layla; Encelia was confirmed hit with its crew unharmed, while the Layla attack remains unverified.
Saudi Arabia paused oil shipments through Bab el‑Mandeb on July 26, resuming them the next day after coalition protective measures were enacted. By July 27–28, reports of explosions and missile activity appeared near the strait.
The United States, with its powerful navy, faces an asymmetric challenge from Iran’s forces in the Strait of Hormuz and from Houthis in the Red Sea, particularly around Bab el‑Mandeb.
Houthis lack the capacity to confront a U.S. carrier group directly, so they rely on mines, explosive‑laden drone boats, anti‑ship missiles, and small‑vessel drones to render key shipping lanes hazardous.
Their objective is to raise the cost and risk of maritime commerce, threatening one of the world’s most critical trade routes.
The Houthis are one of three principal Iran‑backed proxy forces, alongside Hezbollah and Hamas. Their main activity has been restricting shipping through attacks on vessels transiting the region.
When the U.S.–Iran conflict intensified, the Houthis issued statements of support but did not join immediately; after a pause of roughly five months, they resumed attacks.
Iran’s broader network has largely avoided direct confrontation; Hezbollah has refrained from attacking Israel, while China and Russia have not intervened overtly, though China has offered behind‑the‑scenes support.
Houthis joined the fight because local geography favors their asymmetric tactics; the Red Sea’s narrow entrance near Yemen is easier to target than the Strait of Hormuz and is vital for European shipping.
Yemen’s terrain and tribal structure have historically frustrated larger militaries, as demonstrated by Egypt’s costly intervention in the 1960s, which failed to secure a decisive victory.
The Houthi movement emerged later, but Yemeni fighters consistently prove difficult to subdue on their own terrain.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates led a coalition against the Houthis from 2015, yet the group remains entrenched in northern Yemen despite years of airstrikes and ground operations.
Britain’s limited naval presence in the region has likewise done little to curb Houthi attacks, underscoring Yemen’s resilience to foreign intervention.
The conflict is conducive to asymmetric warfare: a few mines or drone attacks can block a strait, and these weapons can be launched from small craft, making a formal Houthi navy vulnerable while intercepting every threat is far more difficult.
Iran’s proxy network operates as separate actors whose objectives align when opposing the United States or Israel. Houthis seized an opportunity for personal gain that also indirectly supports Iran, and other allies may act similarly when advantageous.
Asymmetric warfare explains skepticism toward plans to cut off Iran’s oil exports by seizing and holding Kharg Island, a heavily defended target. A naval blockade could achieve the goal without the costs of occupying territory.
Comparisons to Afghanistan and Vietnam are unavoidable. In both conflicts, the United States achieved initial objectives but struggled to maintain control and establish lasting democratic governance.
The Afghan war ended with withdrawal on August 30, 2021; the Taliban returned to power after nearly 2,500 U.S. casualties and a cost of roughly $2 trillion.
In Vietnam, the United States won most battles but withdrew in 1973, allowing communists to consolidate rule.
These wars demonstrate that military victory does not guarantee a stable government that the United States can support long term.
Both conflicts predated today’s technology. Earlier asymmetric warfare relied on improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers; today drones give small forces destructive power to challenge invasion or occupation.
